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The Malagasy land reform, ongoing since 2005, belongs to the new generation of land reforms.  It 
promotes the legal recognition of existing landholders’ rights (through certification) and the 
decentralization of land management. Despite the change of paradigm underlying this new wave of 
reforms, premises and expectations remain unchanged: a) rights legalization is justified by large tenure 
insecurity and b) rights formalization is a prerequisite to reduce conflicts over land rights, improve 
access to credit, boost productive investments and stimulate land markets. But before analyzing 
economic impacts, the relations between land reform and tenure security need to be explored. In this 
line, the paper first explores the determinant of the sense of tenure insecurity and underlines the 
complementary role of certification to informal and existing modes of rights validation (petits 
papiers). It shows then that decentralization of land management (through the creation of local land 
offices) offers a better and a more equitable access to legal information, land administration 
institutions, legalization of rights and devices of conflict resolution. But it also underlines that this 
ongoing process of legal empowerment still need to be more inclusive for the poor and discusses the 
ways to reinforce this process without denying the reality of local/customary land practices.  
Key-words: certification, land reform, legal empowerment, tenure security, Madagascar.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1990’s has seen a new wave of tenure reforms. The new paradigm is to accompany the gradual 
evolution of land tenure through the legal recognition of existing landholders’ rights and not to 
substitute a system based on land registration and ownership titles for customary land tenure (Bruce et 
al., 1994).  The legal recognition of customary rights is implemented through the decentralization of 
land management and the conception of new and local registration process in order to reconcile 
legitimacy, legality and actual practices (Le Roy et al., 1996, Lavigne-Delville (dir), 1998).  
The Malagasy land reform ongoing since 2005 belongs to this new generation of land reforms. In line 
with the recommendations and the support of various of international institutions (World Bank, 2003; 
European Union 2004; FAO, 2006), this new land policy aims at giving legal standing to local land 
rights and at decentralizing land management (Teyssier et al., 2009). Indeed, the 2005 land law 
stipulates that untitled but occupied land is no longer the property of the state but the occupants. 
Moreover, local governments (Commune in French) have been granted new powers. The establishment 
of a local land registry office (guichet foncier) allows them to legalize private property rights through 
the issue of individual or collective land certificates (certificat foncier). Legalization of property rights 
is not systematic but engaged on landowners’ demand. It is done through the recognition of existing 
rights and public and contestable procedures. In October 2011, 400 Malagasy municipalities, or one-
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fourth of the total number of municipalities at the country level, had set up land registry offices. The 
latter have received 120 000 applications and delivered approximately 60,000 certificates in about four 
years. Over the same period, the State land services have delivered by the means of registration an 
average of 1,500 land titles per year (www.observatoire-foncier.mg). 
Despite the change of paradigm underlying the land reforms, this new wave of reforms is based on the 
same premises as before: households have unsecure land rights and their demand for legalized land 
rights is strong. This new wave of land reforms also feeds the same expectations in terms of impacts. 
In Madagascar, legalization of rights was justified by presumed large tenure insecurity and seen as a 
prerequisite to reduce conflicts over land rights, improve access to credit, boost productive 
investments and stimulate land markets – see e.g. Lettre de Politique Foncière (2005).  
However, debates about land reform impacts are numerous. Controversies and various empirical 
results partly come from the diverse definition of “land reform”, “tenure security” and “impacts”, and 
the complex relations linking them. The scheme  ‘land reform enhances tenure security which in turn 
induces impacts – such as access to credit, increase in investments, reduction of conflicts’  is quite 
different from the ground realities (Deininger and Feder, 2009). 
First, large differences exist among the past and ongoing land reforms implemented in the various 
countries, not only in their legal basis (institutions, rules and legal registration system created or 
renewed) but also in their processes of implementation (Bruce and Migot-Adholla (eds), 1994; 
Lavigne-Delville (eds), 1998; Benjaminsen and Lund (eds), 2004; Colin et al. (eds), 2009).  
Second, there is a great deal of variation in how tenure security is defined: either in reference to the 
substance of rights (range of use rights or full property rights) or to the assurance of rights (fear or 
probability of losing all or part of rights held) (Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997 & 2000; Lavigne Delville 
et al., 1998; for a recent and complete review Arnot et al., 2011)1.  
Third, before analyzing economic impacts (credit, investment and land markets), the relations between 
land reform and tenure security need to be explored. These relations are no more straightforward once 
tenure insecurity is defined as the perceived risk to lose one’s land rights and not as the only fact of 
holding no legal document (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Lavigne Delville, 1998; Deininger and 
Feder, 2009; Colin et al., 2009). Land reforms, based on the supply-driven establishment of new land 
administration institutions or legal empowerment of local authorities, generally strengthen institutional 
and normative pluralism (Lavigne Delville et al., 1998; Lund, 2001). The effects on tenure security 
depend on the land users’ perception about the (new) land institution’s legitimacy, reliability and 
                                                     
1 In this line and for both type of definition, there is also a great deal of variation in how security is measured: for 
the former type of definition, range of use or transferability rights, or holding of a legal title, or duration of 
possession, for the latter, probability of eviction or existing conflicts (eg Arnot and al., 2011). 
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accessibility; which in turns depends on technical and socio-political practices on the ground (from 
updating register to clientelism). In addition, the implementation of reform itself – notably when legal 
documents are delivered on users’ demand and not on a systematic basis – can lead to the exclusion of 
some rights holders (inter alia women, foreign born or cattle herders).  It can indeed give the better off, 
better informed, better socially endowed or those who were born in the village and live there on a 
permanent basis the opportunity to legalize their rights without informing and getting the other land 
right users’ approval (e.g. Deininger and Feder, 2009). Lastly, land reform can provoke debates and 
struggles over land control among institutions that lead to conflict (Berry, 2004 & 2009; Sikor and 
Lund, 2009), and can open new routes for “institutional shopping” (V. Benda-Beckman, 1981) that 
may lead to make conflict more complex (Lund, 2001).  
Those relations between land reform and tenure security, much investigated and yet still controversial 
in the scientific literature deserve to be re-examined in the Malagasy context. This paper aims at 
assessing the impact of the ongoing and still recent land reform on tenure security through the concept 
of legal empowerment2. In the Malagasy context, are land decentralization and certification conductive 
to an inclusive legal empowerment? In other words, do they allow better and more equitable access to 
information, to land administration institutions, to land rights' legalization and help resolve conflicts?  
The communication opens with the presentation of methodology. In the following section, it presents 
the Malagasy land reform and the different modes of land rights validation. It explores then the 
relations between land insecurity and land reform, which implies not only to define and measure 
tenurial insecurity but also to disentangle the diverse ways and rationales to secure land. In the fourth 
section, the communication emphasizes how land reform impact on tenure security through legal 
empowerment. In the final section, it deals with the policy implications to favor  a more inclusive 
process of land rights legalization.  
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The paper uses first-hand data that were collected through a specially designed survey conducted in 
October 2011 on a large sample of 1,862 rural households residing in four regions and nine communes 
of Madagascar (see Figure 1). Within each chosen commune, the survey was completed by a 
qualitative fieldwork through focus groups. Regions and communes were first selected in a convenient 
way in order to reflect the diversity of land tenure practices as well as the strong heterogeneity in 
certification rates between regions and communes (Table 1). Land reform is still relatively recent - the 
                                                     
2 “Empowerment” is the process whereby disadvantaged groups acquire greater control over decisions and 
processes affecting their lives. “Legal empowerment” is the process through which knowledge and uses of law 
bolster human agency (Cotula and Mathieu, 2008). 
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“oldest” local land office was 3 years old at the time of the survey (opened in July 2008) and most of 
them benefited from at best 6 months of financial support - most development agencies stop their 
funding due to the coup d’état in Mars 2009.  
[Figure 1 and Table 1] 
Then, within each commune, households were randomly selected, in such a way to ensure that at least 
one third of the sample households has certificates (or about to have one). The database is thus 
composed of 1,862 households among which 37% have at least one land certificate, and 7,697 plots of 
land among which 20% are certified or about to be. Results are weighted3 in order to be representative 
at the commune level, using country-representative survey data: National Agriculture Census 
(MinAgri, 2004) and Permanent Household Surveys (Instat, 2010).  
Because there is no baseline survey, many retrospective questions relating to the last five years were 
included in the questionnaire, so as to allow the potential changes induced by the reform to be 
assessed, as in Jacoby and Minten in 2005.   
The questionnaire was designed so as to include various modules on land documentation, land tenure 
practices, perceived tenure insecurity, conflicts, investment, and land transactions for all households’ 
plots. It strongly benefited from previous in-depth qualitative interviews conducted by one of the 
authors – Boué (e.g Boué et al., 2011) – in the rural municipality of Faratsiho, which provide a full 
description of land practices, sources of land tenure insecurity and existing means of securing tenure 
rights in the Malagasy context.  
The main limitation of the sampling design is that it does not allow to properly assessing the impact of 
the Malagasy land reform at the national level. The way the regions and communes were selected only 
allows shedding light on what happened in some given places, and based on this, to figure out what is 
to be expected in all the regions where the reform has not really started yet. In addition, analysis 
presented here is mainly conducted on the pooled sample. Hence, the paper underlines first results but 
further analyses at regional level are necessary to take in account the regional dynamics.  
III. CONTEXT 
MALAGASY LAND REFORM 
Before the land reform, all untitled land subject or not to claims of customary ownership was deemed 
to be state-owned. The only way to legally secure land rights was to obtain a land title delivered by the 
state land services (‘Land services’). Since 2005, the land laws have stipulated that untitled but 
                                                     
3 Weighting is based on the ratio “number of household engaged in certification/ number of households”.  
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occupied land was no longer the ‘property of the state’ and was deemed ‘untitled private property’. 
This has resulted in a substantial decrease in state-owned land and a new allocation of responsibilities 
with regards to legal land registration. Since 2005, local governments, through their local land registry 
office have been allowed to issue individual or collective land certificates on “untitled private 
property” land.   
Thus, two types of legal authorities (land services and local governments) can legally recognize land 
claims as legal private property and manage land issues. Land right holders can choose the means of 
legalizing their rights either through a title deed or through a certificate. Both confer similar legal 
property rights: the certificate entitles the owner to all transactions already allowed with titled land, 
including sale, inheritance, long-term lease, and mortgage.  
Needless to say, these laws do not operate in a vacuum but, to rephrase Griffiths (1992), in a social 
field that is governed by laws, rules and conventions of different origins and that generates its own 
rules of the game. Next to these legal authorities, different local state or non state authorities operate at 
the local level to legitimize, even formalize through written documents, different bundles of land 
rights or land transactions: descendants of royal families, elders, village chiefs, mayor, etc. (see e.g. 
Rakoto, 1995; Ottino, 1998; Leroy et al., 2006; Aubert et al., 2008; Omrane, 2008; Muttenzerg, 2010).  
In this context of institutional and normative pluralism, securing property rights requires a 
combination of rights validation at both local and state levels. In practice, Malagasy households 
combine various ways to secure land. The first one is through social recognition. The second one 
includes legal documents: both certificate and title. The third one results from the local recording 
systems, the so-called “petits papiers”. These papers, broken up here in two categories – simple or 
official– offer a first formalization of rights or more exactly, an “informal formalization of rights” 
(Mathieu, 2001; Lavigne-Delville, 2002)4. The “simple” petits papiers are handwritten documents 
accompanying transactions (sale, inheritance and donation). They can also attest property, notably, on 
the basis of the improvement principle (principe de mise en valeur). They are signed by both parties to 
the transaction and/or possibly other witnesses (family members or others).  The “official” petits 
papiers  are very much like the simple ones except the fact that they are signed and/or stamped by a 
representative of local state authorities (head of village, mayor, etc).  In addition to this rich diversity 
of land documents, sometimes people also consider land tax receipts as a proof of ownership. Petits 
papiers and tax receipts have not strict legal validity but they can act as a first proof of property in 
case of conflicts (Rochegude, 2001).  
                                                     
4 “Formalization” means in this paper the use of all type of land documents, “informal formalization” means the 





Extrapolated figures based on the survey data show that two thirds of the households own between 2 
and 4 plots, with a medium farm size of about 1.80 hectare (all  households own at least one plot and 
55% of the plots are smaller than 0.5 ha). Next to housing (25% of the sample plots), plots are mainly 
dedicated to rice production- the main production and food for all rural households (45% of the sample 
plots, 63% of the cultivated sample plots)5.   
Transfers among relatives represent the principal mode of access to land (52% of the plots were 
inherited and 4.4% donated). Land purchase is also an important way to acquire land. In the studied 
communes, 37% were acquired through purchase6. Appropriation by land development still exists but 
is limited (6.7%). The low percentage of appropriated/cleared plots as compared to the high 
percentage of purchased ones indicates that most of the land in the studied area is already 
appropriated. According to the interviewees, men, women, couples or even families as a whole can 
own the land, but men, in line with inheritance, local and customary rules, are the main owners (62% 
of the plots are owned by men, 24% by couples, 11.5% by women and 2% by families). 
Households farm themselves the majority of the plots. But rental markets and more exactly forms of 
temporary use rights transfers are quite active. Sharecropping, leasing and also transfer being part of 
mutual aid system such as loan are particularly frequent on rice plots (8.4% of the rice plots) and in a 
lesser proportion for other annual and perennial crops (3.3%)7.  
HOUSEHOLDS’ MODES OF RIGHTS VALIDATION 
To give the general picture, only 8% of the households have no document at all on all their plots. The 
large majority (83.2 %) has at least one written document on one of its plots (i.e. has at least one petit 
papier or tax receipt). The legalization of rights only concerns a minority:  9% have at least one legal 
document on one of its plots (respectively 8.2% and 0.9% have applied to or possess at least one 
certificate or one title8). Of course, households can have documents on several of their plots.  
At the plot level, the frequency of petits papiers proves that people want to formally validate their land 
rights: 60% of the plots are secured by petits papiers (3/4 being “simple”, ¼ being “official”), and 
23% have a tax receipt (Figure 2). About 11 % of the plots have no document. And then, 6% of the 
                                                     
5 Pastures, as they are most of the time collectively managed, were not systematically declared. We do not take 
them in account in the following analysis even if they are crucial for herders.  
6 In 2001, at a national level, 16% of the land was acquired through this way (Minten and Razafaindraibe, 2003). 
As the process is cumulative, it is coherent to observe ten years later a higher rate of purchased plots.  
7 The frequency of temporary use rights transfers appear to be similar to the one observed in 2001 at the national 
level - 8% of the rice plots and 4% of other plots were under some form of rental agreement (Minten and 
Razaindraibe, 2003). According to Jacoby and Minten (2005), tenancy is limited in Madagascar as a whole 
largely because land ownership is not very concentrated. 
8 There are strong inter commune variation, from 3 to 30% for certificate and from 0.1% to 4.4% for title. 
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plots are legally secured: 5.6% with a certificate and only 0.5% with a land title. Also, very often, 
households have a combination of documents on a given plot (two types of petits papiers for e.g., one 
petit papier and a tax receipt, or one petit papier and one certificate). A quarter of plots cumulates two 
types of land documents and 8% cumulate three types. 
 [Figure 2] 
IV. DISENTANGLING THE SENSE OF TENURE SECURITY  
HOW TO DEFINE AND MEASURE TENURE INSECURITY?  
Land tenure security can be defined as a process that allows rights holders to gain a social and legal 
recognition of their rights and to reaffirm it against challenging claims (Lavigne Delville et al. 1998; 
Sjaastad and Bromley, 2000).  “This definition is relative rather than substantive. It is not attached to 
a particular bundle of property rights (such as private property) nor to a particular institutional 
support (such as statutory law and state-issued titles)” (Bouquet, 2009:1390). Tenure security is then 
as much a matter of perception as a legal category (Hesseling, 1991: 203 in Lavigne Delville et al., 
2008).   
For example, in Madagascar, holding a land title does not systematically imply having deep feeling of 
tenure security. A land title holder may consider his rights as not totally secured – notably if the land 
conservation system is not up to date (torn or lost land register, title in the name of the dead parents) or 
if State land administration practices are not transparent (clientelism, corruption) (Jacoby and Minten, 
2005; Teyssier, 2009; Muzzenberg, 2010). By contrast, landholders having no land document 
validating their rights but enjoying a strong social recognition may feel very secure about their land - 
notably when they are tompon-tany, master of the land as land was owned by their ancestors and 
passed on to them (e.g. Ottino, 1998; Evers, 2005).  
According to this acceptation, landholders’ sense of tenure insecurity comes from the perception that 
someone can challenge their land rights and eventually, make them lose their rights. And, as land 
security itself may evolve over time (Leroy et al. 1996), perception can evolve depending on the 
sources of insecurity, the conditions conductive to insecurity and on the means available to enhance 
land security. In what follows, two dimensions of tenure insecurity are analytically dissociated and 
evaluated through specific questions9 (see Figure 3):  
                                                     
9 Perception is then difficult to measure. The following question, asked for each plot and referring to the present 
time was supposed to capture the sense of tenure security: “Are you afraid of having your rights challenged by 
tenant, former landowner, relatives, neighbors, villagers, outsiders or State?”. The answers clearly reveal that 
interviewed people refer to on-going threats or effective risks. Then, in a “learning by analyzing process”, we 
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‐ a short-term/concrete sense of insecurity referring to on-going threats or effective risks at the time 
of survey (at t). We measure it on each plot by asking farmers whether they think their rights might 
be challenged by, alternatively, relatives, neighbors, villagers, outsiders, the former landowner, one 
tenant or the State.  
‐  a long-term/diffuse sense of insecurity referring to potential risks. We measure it through the 
answers to 2 distinct questions in the questionnaire : (i) the question of the motives that encouraged 
farmers to start a legal procedure on their plots, for those farmers who had a plot either certified or 
about to be at the time of the survey; (ii)  the question of how farmers perceive the utility of a legal 
document on their plots that are legally “certifiable”, being aware, for this latter point, that the 
context and structure of the interview could have highly influenced people’s answers ( cf Olivier de 
Sardan, 1995).  
[Figure 3] 
DISTRIBUTION OF INSECURITY  
The land reform was launched on the postulate that households were tenure insecure or at least that 
they were looking for devices to validate their land rights, as exemplified by the large use of petits 
papiers. Within the 9 communes under concern, only 8.2% of the households actually have a concrete 
sense of tenure insecurity and 4.3% of the plots are concerned 10. Households’ sense of concrete tenure 
insecurity is thus rather low.   
But, households can also have a more diffuse sense of tenure insecurity. This subjective appreciation 
is not strictly proportional to the number of land disputes or expropriation due to a lack of proper 
documentation. A low frequency of challenging claims or a low risk of expropriation - as estimated for 
example by Jacoby and Minten (2005) in the Alaotra region11 - do not prevent a diffuse sense of 
insecurity from being high. Indeed, individuals can attach importance to some significant events even 
if they have a low probability to occur (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Bellemare 2011). Our data 
can only infer the existence of this diffuse sense of insecurity but they do not allow to precisely 
quantify it. Among those households who have engaged in the process of certification (8% of the 
households) motives for doing so are all more or less relating to their willingness to secure their rights: 
72% declared that they wanted to avoid all potential contestations ; 9% to enhance the  tenure security 
                                                                                                                                                                      
analytically dissociate two dimensions of tenurial insecurity. As the analytical distinction came afterwards, we 
cannot precisely measure the diffuse sense of insecurity but only infer its existence (cf. annex B). 
10 With strong variation between communes: from 3 to 13% households and from 1% to 10% plots.  
11 Household were asked whether they had heard of cases of households having lost land because they lacked 
proper documentation, 91% responded rarely or never (Jacoby and Minten, 2005:12). 
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for their children12.  In other words, they perceive land certificates as a long-term protection against all 
types of competing claims. In addition, the vast majority of households (92%) stated that certification 
would be useful to protect their rights13.  
SOURCES OF, CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO, AND MEANS OF REDUCING TENURE INSECURITY  
Insecurity exists because people faced, are facing or are afraid of facing a land conflict. Concerning 
the concrete sense of insecurity and in line with others studies (Pavageau, 1981; Ottino, 1998; Rakoto, 
1995), and on the sample people stating that they fear of facing competing claims, people mentioned 
that relatives are/could be the main challengers (in 52% of the cases). The other (potential) opponents 
are tenants (17%), outsiders (13%), villagers (11%) and, finally, marginally, former land owners - for 
plots acquired through purchase (3.6%), neighbors (2.2%) or the State (1.3%). A concrete sense of 
insecurity is also quite frequent when a conflict occurred in the past or is unresolved14.    
Repeated fieldworks (Boué et al., 2011, our data) have shown that several conditions may be 
conductive to fear or effective competing claims (see Figure 4). Some conditions are global and 
related to the history of the locality and to the context of institutional and legal pluralism (coexistence 
of customary, local and legal rules implemented by diverse authorities)15. Some other conditions are 
directly related to plots', owners' and households' characteristics among which: 
‐ the economic value of the plot (area and type of crops), i.e. not necessarily its market price but its 
importance in relation to a household's income or self-consumption. The more crucial a plot for a 
household’s livelihood, the more frightened a household   of competing claims;  
‐  the ability to control it (distance between house and plot),  
‐ the mode of acquisition of the plot (inherited, purchased, donated or cleared). In particular, and 
based on fieldworks and descriptive statistics, landowners may fear competing claims from 
relatives on inherited plots, from landowners or tenants on purchased plot, from the heirs of former 
landowners on donated plots, and from neighbors, villagers or outsiders on improved/cleared plots;  
                                                     
12 They also engage certification to reduce short term insecurity: to confirm the plot limits (7%) or stop a conflict 
(3%). Less proactive motives (to do like the neighbor or to do it due to the communication campaign) are about 
9%. 
13 They first answered - for the plots legally “certifiable” - that they could engaged certification without specific 
authorizations from family or traditional authorities: suggesting that they may have the whole bundle of property 
right.  They then specified that certificate could indeed be useful – which may be a polite answer framed by the 
interview context. But they lastly explained that they do not effectively ask for one - even if they proposed a 
price close to the actual price – mainly because they have other priority expenditure (55%)  or they do not know 
it enough (20%).  
14 As we will see later on, the ranking of potential challengers is quite different from the one of effective 
opponents in case of conflicts, notably, disputes with relatives and neighbors being more frequent and disputes 
with tenant and state being rare.  
15 Later on, we consider that these global conditions are similar for the 9 communes. 
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‐ the household’s financial, human and social capital, with poor households having potentially less 
resources and power to claim their rights and get support.  
‐ the identity of the owner (men, women, couples, families, natives, foreign born). In particular, 
women or foreign born may have less prerogatives according to the local/customary rules to access 
and own land;  
Within the 9 communes under concern, households have potentially two means of reducing their 
perception of tenure security. First, they can undertake labor or financial investment on their plots, 
such as clearing, cultivating, tree planting, improving developments and even, but more rarely, 
fencing. Investments done on a plot can favor tenure insecurity as the rights holders can fear to lose 
the benefits of those investments. But, turning it the other way round, tenure insecurity can also favor 
investment, notably when labor and improvement are principles on which property rights are built and 
when investments are visible such as trees (e.g. Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). Second, households have 
diverse modes of rights validation: social recognition, petits papiers, tax receipt, certificate or land 
title.  
[Figure 4] 
WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS OF SENSE OF TENURE INSECURITY? 
In order to explore the relations between land reform and tenure security, we first explore whether 
having a certificate has an impact on a household's sense of tenure security. This requires investigating 
more generally what conditions and means impact on the fear of facing competing claims, i.e. the 
concrete sense of insecurity (which is the only robust measure we have and which concerns the 
household perception at the time of the survey). We thus run two different sets of regressions : one 
which aims at emphasizing the correlations between plot and household characteristics (including 
mode of acquisition) and absence of fear (i.e. security feeling) (see Table 2) ; and one which aims at 
investigating whether the impact of a document (be it a title, a certificate, a petit papier or a tax 
receipt) varies between plots that been acquired through purchase, inheritance or any other mode of 
acquisition (see Table 3).  
[Table 2 & Table 3] 
On the basis of these results, the probability of perceived tenure insecurity increases: 
- when the plot’s economic value increases, i.e. when there are rice crops (crucial for food 
consumption) and perennial crops (such as Eucalyptus constituting a reserve of capital or Cacao 
assuring cash revenue, but the presence of perennial crops can also show, due to the twofold causality 




- when plots are acquired through improvement (Table 2), especially when there is no land document 
(Table 3). Improvement generally occurs on distant hill land and limits are not as clearly delimitated 
as on rice plots. Owners fear that neighbors or villagers change the limits or make an abusive 
appropriation. But insecurity also occurs on plots acquired through inheritance, donation and purchase 
when these latter have not any document or just a tax receipt (Table 3);   
- when plots are owned by the family plots and acquired through donation (Table 3). Donation 
generally favors one child or a nephew/niece and the owner and his/her heirs fear that the other former 
owner’s heirs contest their rights after the donor’s death; 
- when, on the ground of local rules, the land user/owner’s status gives them less prerogatives such as 
new comers. Interviewed people stated to be foreign born as soon as their family’s tomb is not located 
in the village they live. Hence, this qualification covers a too large diversity of situations ranging from 
people originating from neighboring villages to people coming from other regions. Thus, the number 
of years spent in the village is a better proxy to evaluate social integration. Insecurity has a higher 
probability when the foreign born are new comers.  
The capacity to easily control the plot (distance between house and plot) does not impact on the 
perceived tenure insecurity as other parameters are stronger (mode of acquisition, identity of the owner 
and modes of rights validation). The fact that women enjoy fewer advantages according to certain 
local and inheritance rules and also face the risk of being expropriated by the family in law once 
becoming widow especially so on inherited plots do not influence – according to our data – the sense 
of tenure security (Table 2). 
On the other hand, the probability of perceived tenure insecurity decreases with: 
- the number of plots, a proxy for agricultural wealth (purchased plots) or for importance of the family 
(inherited plots) (Table 2). Owners, notably on inherited and donated plots, enjoy a strong social role 
and position inside their large family protecting them against competing claims from relatives (Table 
3). Nevertheless, this social position does not protect them against outsiders on purchased or cleared 
plots. However, household wealth (as measured by a score computed using housing equipment) is not 
significant; 
-  the formalization and legalization of rights.  Absence of land document does not systematically 
imply tenure insecurity - the majority of households who do not have any document are not afraid of 
losing their right on a short-term perspective. But the probability of tenure insecurity decreases with 
the formalization of rights: tax receipt for donated or improved plots and, above all, little papers or 
certificate (Tables 2 and 3). Certification effectively works only when the process is completed and the 
owner got his certificate (that may indicate that people were effectively unsecured when they asked for 
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a certificate16). Land titles impact positively on tenure security only on donated or improved plots, but 
negatively on purchased plot – because, often, updating of the title after a land sales is not finalized 
(the buyer discovers that the seller was not the only owner or had not a title on his name, or the 
procedure is long and costly – cf Jacoby and Minten (2005)).   
Thus holding a certificate has a positive impact on sense of tenure security (once effectively obtained). 
Certificate seems to impact more on security than land title but as much as petits papiers. As Boue an 
co-authors (2011) underlined it, land certificates represent indeed a complement to petits papiers and 
are often not considered as a substitute (the increasing demand for certificate does not induce a 
decrease in demand for petits papiers). Indeed, households ask more frequently a certificate on plots 
having no document (Annex 1). They seize the opportunity to increase tenure security on the riskier 
plots. In addition, certificates offer a long term protection (cf. people’s motives for certification to 
secure in the future their children’s rights). Owners establish petits papiers at the time of the 
transaction and some plan to engage certification later on, when they have less financial constraints.  
Land certificates have a positive impact on the sense of tenure security. But is it the only channel to 
reduce perceived tenure insecurity? Has land decentralization had other effects on tenure insecurity? 
And are those effects the same for all households?  
V. LAND DECENTRALIZATION, CERTIFICATION AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT  
In the context of land tenure, the legal empowerment of the poor could be defined as the multiple 
processes and actions thanks to which (poor) people become more skilled, more powerful and 
eventually better able to use legal institutions and procedures to assert, document and defend their land 
rights (Hatcher et al., 2007). Hence, the questions are: has the reform allowed a better and a more 
equitable access to appropriate legal information, land administration institutions, legal procedures and 
devices of conflict resolution?  
INFORMATION AND LEGAL LAND INSTITUTION ACCESSES  
The availability of legal information is one component of legal empowerment in general and for 
securing land rights in particular. Until recently (Deininger et al., 2008; Cotula et Mathieu, 2008), it 
has never been included in the range of land reform impacts. The availability of appropriate 
information means not only that people are informed (‘rights awareness’) but also that people 
effectively overcome social, bureaucratic and cost barriers in order to access to legal land institutions 
(‘rights enablement’) (Bruce et al, 2007).  
                                                     
16 It can also include situation where tenure insecurity could have been awaken due to the certification process – 
but these cases are rather limited (cf. part on conflicts).  
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Within the 9 communes under concern, the majority of households knows about the existence of the 
Local Land Office (72%) and about land certificates (2/3 of those who know about the existence of a 
LLO). Mayors and agents of the Local land Office are the main sources of information (for 44% and 
20% of households respectively), followed by relatives and neighbors or radio and press (for 
respectively 22% and 12% of households). While information on this new land institution appears to 
be well distributed across municipalities and villages, information does not circulate perfectly within 
municipalities and villages. We find indeed that the probability to be informed does not decrease when 
a household lives in a remote location but that it decreases when the household head is a woman, is 
younger or less educated. These findings underline the substantial role of communal staff in 
supporting the local land office and the impact of communication campaigns held within villages.  
Overall, 31% of the households who knows about the existence of the local land office have visited it 
at least once. This attendance rate, at first glance limited, is actually five times bigger than the one 
observed for regional land services (see Figure 5). Moreover, 4/5 of these visitors had never been 
before to a legal land institution. Local land offices are more geographically but also more socially 
accessible than regional land services. The probability to visit the land office increases when the 
household head is older, more educated and richer but does not decrease when the household head is a 
women, a foreign born or live in a remote place. Hence, households’ financial and human capital 
capacities still ease legal land institution access but certain households’ social characteristics (gender, 
natives or not) do no prevent them – according to a self excluding behavior or social constraints - to 
visit the local land office. Lastly, 2/3 of the households visited land institutions to get information: 
respectively 74% and 26% were satisfied after consulting the local land office and regional land 
services.  
Local land offices appear then to be more accessible and user-friendly than regional land services. 
Their contribution for securing land rights is not limited to the delivering of legal documents but also 
includes information services. Indeed, some land users come to the local land office to check that their 
plot is not located on a piece of land titled in the name of the State or private owners. This 
information, free at the local land office but costly to obtain at the regional land services (notably due 
to transaction costs – transport, waiting time, corruption), is likely to be crucial to make them feel 
more secure. That may also contribute to explain why 2/3 of the land users going to local land office 
do not ask directly for a land certificate (they may ask for one after a while, when they have the 
capital).   
 [Figure 5] 
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ACCESS TO AND PRACTICES OF RIGHTS LEGALIZATION   
Land decentralization eases rights awareness (knowing and understanding rights and processes to 
enforce them) and rights enablement (legal institution access). But does it offer affordable and fair 
mechanisms to enforce rights? 
Cost and time requested to get a certificate 
In line with the annual analysis of the Malagasy land observatory17, our data confirm that the cost of a 
certificate is 50 times lesser than that of a land title – while the median cost of a certificate is 2 USD, it 
is 95 USD in the case of a land title (without taking into account transaction costs – transport, 
corruption, etc. – which can make the cost of a title even much higher). However, the cost of a 
certificate varies by commune (pricing policy) and has increased recently due to the withdrawal of 
international aid and low national subsidies. The legal procedure to obtain a certificate is also shorter 
than the one to get a land title: 65% of the landowners got their certificate in less than one year, versus 
25% for those who asked for a title (and 53% had to wait between 3 and 11 years)18 (see Figure 6). 
The users’ point of view is clear-cut. While a minority of certificate holders find the procedure too 
expensive and too long (respectively 5% and 11%), the majority of title holders judge that the 
procedure is far too costly and much too long (respectively 72% and 95%). Indeed, people often 
qualify land titles as inaccessible. Certificates are by contrast more accessible but their relative 
advantage over titles vanishes once they are compared with petits papiers (median cost is 0,25 USD).  
 [Figure 6] 
Households’ profile (wealth, remoteness as well as head’s age and education)  
Certification is on demand and non systematic as it was the case, for example, in Ethiopia (Deininger 
et al., 2008). Then, is certification a process conductive to exclusion? The following results are based 
on descriptive statistics (household characteristics by mode of rights’ validation) and regressions (cf. 
annex 1 to 3). 
Households who have either asked or obtained a certificate are led by heads of all ages and levels of 
education. Most of them have never been further than primary school (16% of certificate holders never 
went to school and 47% only in primary school). Despite its administrative nature, the certification 
procedure thus appears to be accessible regardless of household heads’ level of education (Annex 3). 
This is quite different for the titling procedure (Annex 3). Title holders are more frequently older and 
                                                     
17 Land Observatory’ data demonstrate that certificate is 50 times less expensive than land title -10 USD instead 
of 507 USD (ECR, 2008; Malagasy Land Observatory, 2011).  
18 Land Observatory’ data also demonstrate that certificate is 6 times quicker to obtain than title - on average 12 
months instead of 6 years (ECR,  2008; Malagasy Land Observatory, 2011) 
16 
 
more educated than other households’ heads. The level of education – often associated not only with 
the ability to engage more complex procedures but also to get a job position generating higher incomes 
– is a strong determinant of access to land titling. 
Households who have a certificate (or are just about to get one) are well represented on the whole 
wealth distribution (and this is so whatever the wealth measure, i.e. be it the first wealth score 
computed on housing conditions o to capture the long term capitalization or the second one based on 
housing equipment to capture monetary incomes). There is no financial barrier to certification. 
Nevertheless, wealth is a determinant of the formalization and legalization of rights (see Figure 7). The 
wealthier the household, the higher the probability his holding a land document: petits papiers, 
certificate and title (Annex 2 & Annex 3). In addition, with regards to certificate, wealth increases the 
probability not only to ask for a certificate but also to ask for several certificates (Annex 3).  
 [Figure 7] 
Households who have engaged into or finalized the certification process have various land assets. But 
they have more frequently more rice plots and more hill land plots (cultivating hill lands implies to 
have or rent a plow and thus to have more financial assets) (Annex 2). Indeed, a household’s number 
of plots is strongly correlated with wealth and age.  Poorer households are still young, have not yet 
inherited and have not enough capital to buy a plot. Having fewer plots and being not allowed to 
formalized/legalized the land rights on their name on family plots, they are less likely to have tax 
receipt, petits papiers and/or certificate.    
Owners’ profile (gender, natives/foreign born)  
Men are the main landowners, thus they are the main certificate holders (74% of the certificates are 
registered under the name of men versus 21% under the name of women. However, women certify 
their plots more than men (7% of the women’s plots versus 4% of the men’s plots). By contrast, no 
clear pattern emerges as regards their marital status or their position as head or spouse of head within 
the household (Annex 2 & Annex 3). Hence, certification seems to offer a real new opportunity for 
women who, especially when they are household heads, do not have any document on their plots.  
However, fewer positive results in terms of women legal empowerment appear on plots declared as 
being the property of the couple. When such plots are certified, the majority are so under the name of 
the husband (82%) (women:12%; couple:6%). Advocated reasons to explain this are local habits – 
men stated that they just did not think about registering their wife (67%) or that is in line with local 
customs (16%) – and lack of information about the possibility to register all the owners of the plot on 
a same certificate (6%).  
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Lastly, foreign born are not excluded and as much represented than the tompon-tany. Indeed, being an 
outsider (coming from either a neighboring village or another region) does not appear to be a 
significant determinant. 
EVOLUTION OF LAND CONFLICTS  
According to development agencies and policy makers, tensions and conflicts are often considered as 
negative phenomena that have to be reduced to promote social and economic development. Conflicts 
are above all a mode of contesting existing rules or their interpretation, of gaining or maintaining 
access to resources, of reasserting control on land access and, more generally, of trying to change the 
balance of power (Le Meur, 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Le Meur and Hochet, 2010). Thus, they are 
inherent in all societies and the point is not necessarily to drastically reduce them but to ease their 
resolution (Cleaver, 2002). In addition, they can help understanding the functioning of land arenas and 
identifying who are the relevant authorities and rules from the actors’ point of view (Roberts, 1994; 
Chauveau and Mathieu, 1998).  
Land tenure security means that landowners or land users can reaffirm their rights in case of 
competing claims (Lavigne Delville, 1998). This is based on the assumption that claimers can access 
to reliable authorities. The question is then: do decentralization and certification have induced more 
conflicts and a change in the mobilization of land authorities? 
Land conflicts are regularly mentioned as the main type of conflicts in courts. In fact, land conflicts 
are not the most frequent but they are often complex to resolve and significant19.  In the 9 studied 
communes, conflicts have concerned or concern 1.7% of the 7 143 owned plots. As observed by 
Jacoby and Minten in the Alaotra region (2005), the frequency of land conflict is thus rather low. Of 
course, conflicts may have been under reported as it is difficult to deal with this touchy issue during a 
quantitative interview.  
In most of the reported cases, conflicts oppose(d) residents of the same village. They oppose(d) the 
landowner to relatives (42%) and villagers (30%)20. In most of the cases, they also concerne(d) rice 
plots (67% of the conflicts). 
For some plots in a situation of conflict, the certification process has been engaged ein order to put an 
end to the conflict (28% of the preexisting conflicts). And, in the majority of those cases, certification 
has effectively allowed the conflict resolution (64% or 18 cases out of 28) and in a proportion slightly 
                                                     
19 According to a recent study realized by the Malagasy Land Observatory, land conflicts represent about 20% of 
civil cases.    
20 The other ones oppose the landowner to outsiders (12%), neighbors (7%), former landowner (6%), tenant (3%) 
and the State (1%).  
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higher than the average rate of conflict resolution (61%21). Certification thus stands as a new route to 
ease the resolution.  
However, certification has also generated or awaked few conflicts (on 2% of the plots concerned by 
certification, which has induced a 10% increase in conflict). These conflicts, once again, mainly 
oppose residents of the same village. But, there are fewer conflicts between relatives – which could 
mean that landowners ask for one certificate only if they have their family’s approval – and more 
conflicts with villagers  -  notably on large rice or perennial plots from 1 to 4 ha) (Figure 8). 
Nevertheless, the procurement of the certificate has allowed solving the conflict in the majority of 
cases (72% or 8 cases out of 11) and in a proportion slightly higher than the average rate of conflict 
resolution (61%). Certification has thus allowed to clarify the situation or to put an end to the majority 
of insecure situations.  
 [Figure 8] 
Such a quantitative approach based on a very small number of observations, together with the fact that 
some certification and conflict resolution are still in progress limit the robustness of the analysis. On 
this very short period, certification has induced a slight increase in conflicts (+2%). But it has also for 
the other certificate holders allowed to enhance their sense of tenure security. Certification offers an 
opportunity to (re)open the discussion about land rights thanks to the phase of rights confirmation on 
the field, gathering the landowner, the neighbors, the elected representatives of the village, the village 
head and the representatives of the communes, and to close it thanks to the intervention of third 
parties.  Nor the Mayor neither the local land office’s agent is allowed to solve the conflict. Most of 
the conflict resolutions are done thanks to the intervention of the village’s representatives and head.  
CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The land reform has effectively contributed to reduce households’ perception of tenure insecurity. One 
postulate of the land reform was that all households were tenure insecure. In fact, few households fear 
to face competing claims on their plots in the short term (concrete sense of tenure insecurity). But, 
effectively, the majority also states that they are not protected against all risk of contestation in the 
long term (diffuse sense of insecurity).  
Holding a certificate effectively reduces the concrete sense of tenure insecurity. Others form of rights 
validation, notably petits papiers, also reduce it. But holding a certificate has the advantages, 
compared to petits papiers, to reduce the diffuse sense of tenurial security and, compared to land title, 
to be more accessible. Land certificates represent indeed a complement to petits papiers and are often 
                                                     
21 Average rate of resolution observed in the sample.  
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not considered as a substitute (the increasing demand for certificate does not induce a decrease in 
demand for petits papiers). Indeed, households ask more frequently a certificate on plots having no 
document.  
In addition, the land reform - and notably the decentralization of land management - has also 
contributed to reduce the sense of tenure insecurity through a legal empowerment process. Accesses to 
land information and legal land institutions are easier. The majority of the households knows the local 
land office, one third of the latter has visited it (whereas most of these visitors were never been before 
to land administration) and has obtain free and valuable information. Access to right legalization 
through certification is far less costly and shorter than through land titling. And, local land offices 
offer a new route to ease conflict resolution. Certification process has indeed induced some conflicts 
but has also eased their resolution and the resolution of preexisting conflicts. All these points underline 
that the function of the local land office is not only to deliver certificate but to inform people and 
orientate them to the most appropriate institutions to solve their conflict. However, information on 
certification process needs to be improved: a) through more communication campaigns in the villages 
to reach more households head and notably women household heads, and b) through better 
explanations on certification to avoid registration on only one name when there are several owners, 
notably women.   
Lastly, a large diversity of households has effectively engaged in certification. Some points are really 
positives: the level of education is not determinant proving that the new designed administrative 
procedure is effectively accessible; the foreign born are not excluded from the certification process 
and women (when they own the plot) resort more than men to certification. But other points are 
important to be questioned. Certification rate is still rather limited (8.2% of the households and 5.6% 
of the plots) and certification access is strongly determined by the households ‘wealth.  
The fact that certification is more accessible for wealthier households, not surprising as the 
certification process in on demand, questions the relevance of a systematic procedure.  And, of course, 
reflections about systematic procedure need to be articulated not only to household level analysis but 
also to plot level analysis. The fact that some plots has less certified than others (such as inherited 
plots or pastures) could mean that the process of certification is not relevant or should be designed 
differently to better recognize existing customary land rights. Reflections about systematic procedure 
need also to be articulated to municipality and region level analysis. The difference in terms of 
certification rate between the municipalities (90% of the households have a certificate in some 
commune versus 3% of the households in other communes) can come from the local land office 
management, the certificate cost but also from the inadequacy of this mode of land validation with 
regard to the customary/local land tenure. Lastly, in communes where systematic procedure could be 
relevant, the reflection on this type of process needs to be articulated with reflections about cost and 
20 
 
sustainability of certification for the municipality, and hence with the other potential functions of the 
local land office in terms of land taxation and land planning.  
The fact that certification access is strongly determined by the households ‘wealth results also question 
the articulation between certificate and petits papiers, these latter being held by the majority of the 
population and the majority of the poor. It notably questions if the petits papiers could have a legal 
value or if the certification process could tend to adopt some of their characteristics (cost, stronger 
implication of the village head and lesser implication of the municipality staff, etc).  
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Analamanga         
   Tsaramasoandro nov-09 2 13 410 1 916 179 120 0,09 (-) 
Vakinankaratra  
   Ambatomena sept-08 3 25 694 3 670 648 557 0,18 (-) 
   Ambohimiarivo août-08 3 12 435 1 553 517 289 0,33 (+/-) 
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   Manandona août-08 3 14 599 2 086 1870 1494 0,90 (+) 
Diana  
   
Antsakoamanondro 
nov-08 
3 11 174 1 862 249 80 0,13 (+/-) 
   Benavony nov-08 3 3 062 502 253 102 0,50 (+) 
Menabe  
   Ampanihy juil-08 3 15 931 2 923 654 567 0,22 (+/-) 
   Malaimbandy nov-09 2 109 432 21 886 724 500 0,03 (-) 
   Analaiva juil-08 3 22 348 4 368 987 752 0,23 (+/-) 
 
Figure 2: distribution of principal modes of rights validation (% of plots) – only the mode stated 
as “principal” by the interviewee is here considered 
 
 


































































































Table 3: Linear Probability Model  of sense  of tenure security after disaggregating the sample of 
plots by mode of acquisition 
 
  Inherited Purchased Donation  Improvement
  nofear nofear nofear  nofear
distance  ‐0.012 0.039*** 0.002  ‐0.016
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.03)
Distance²  0.001 ‐0.003* 0.001  0.004
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01)
Plot area   0.008 ‐0.001 ‐0.015  ‐0.029
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.02)
Area²  ‐0.003 0.000 0.004  0.003
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00)




Land title  ‐0.011 0.170* 0.157*  0.292***
  (0.04) (0.10) (0.08)  (0.09)
Certificate  0.025 0.204*** 0.156***  0.112*
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)
Certification in progress   ‐0.395*** 0.085  ‐0.123
  (0.08) (0.08)  (0.18)
Petits papiers  0.003 0.208*** 0.155***  0.161***
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.04)
Tax receipt  ‐0.033 0.151** 0.132**  0.149***
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.04)




Rice  0.008 ‐0.031* 0.034  0.009
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)
Perennial crops  ‐0.073 ‐0.029 ‐0.043  ‐0.018




Madame  ‐0.039 ‐0.002 0.013  0.045**
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.02)
Couple  ‐0.027 0.022 ‐0.007  0.044**
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.02)
Family (indivision)  ‐0.021 0.040 ‐0.571*  0.126**








‐0.002 ‐0.012*** 0.001  ‐0.021***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01)
Foreign born household head  0.080* 0.061* 0.166***  0.103***
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.02)
Number  of  years  in  the 
locality (foreign born) 
0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002**  0.001***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Age of head  0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027***  0.025***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Age²  ‐0.000*** ‐0.000*** ‐0.000***  ‐0.000***
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Number  of  plots  owned  by 
the household 
0.012*** 0.005** 0.012  0.005
  3847 2554 298  444
Constant  0.080* 0.061* 0.166***  0.103***
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.02)
Observations  3847  2554 298 444





Figure 5: Percentage of households who ever went to local land offices or state land 




Figure 6: Time requested to get a legal document (% of holders) 
 












Annex 1: Predictive factors of certification. Linear probability model with household fixe effects.  
 Parcelle certifiée ou en cours de certification 
Superficie de la parcelle (ha) 0.014** 
 (0.01) 
Superficie de la parcelle² (ha) -0.000 
 (0.00) 
Distance à la parcelle (heures) 0.000 
 (0.01) 
Parcelle en faire-valoir indirect -0.010 
 (0.02) 
Mode d’accès (réf. : héritage)  
Achat  0.064*** 
 (0.01) 
Donation  0.045*** 
 (0.01) 
Mise en valeur  0.031*** 
 (0.01) 


























Propriétaire de la parcelle (réf : Monsieur)  
Madame 0.064*** 
 (0.02) 
Couple  -0.009 
 (0.01) 
Famille  0.013 
 (0.02) 
Autre  -0.022 
 (0.03) 
Modes de sécurisation de la parcelle, hors certificat (réf : aucun document)  
PP simples -0.125*** 
 (0.02) 
PP officialisés -0.092*** 
 (0.03) 
Quittance d’impôt -0.012 
 (0.03) 
PP simples + officialisés -0.163*** 
 (0.03) 
PP simples + quittance d’impôt -0.105*** 
 (0.02) 
PP officialisés + quittance d’impôt -0.105*** 
 (0.03) 
PP simples + officialisés+ quittance d’impôt -0.188*** 
 (0.05) 





Notes: Ecarts-type entre parenthèses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Régressions OLS avec effet fixe ménage, 
pondérées pour prendre en compte la surreprésentation des ménages demandeurs de certificat. Les parcelles 
immatriculées sont exclues de la régression (84 parcelles). La variable dépendante est égale à 1 si une demande 







Annex 2: Household’s characteristics according to the mode of rights validation 
    Sans document Petit papier/Quittance d'impôt Certificat foncier Titre foncier 
    Non Oui  Non Oui  Non Oui  Non Oui  
Age du chef de ménage 46,59 42,78 * 46,61 46,22  45,99 49,61 *** 46,19 56,57 *** 
Niveau d'éducation du chef 2,08 1,98  2,18 2,04 * 2,04 2,36 *** 2,06 2,62 *** 
Score de richesse du ménage (actifs) -0,66 -0,69  0,07 -0,82 *** -0,79 0,75 *** -0,68 1,30 *** 
Score de richesse du ménage (habitat) -0,61 -0,35 ** 0,00 -0,71 *** -0,67 0,29 *** -0,60 0,62 *** 
Chef de ménage est une femme 0,11 0,24 ** 0,19 0,11 ** 0,12 0,14  0,13 0,07  
Taille du ménage 5,42 5,96  5,83 5,39 * 5,44 5,74  5,45 6,55 * 
Nombre d'enfants moins de 14 ans 2,21 2,78 * 2,34 2,24  2,28 1,98 ** 2,26 1,97  
Nombre d'adultes de 14 à 65 ans 3,03 3,01  3,30 2,98 *** 2,98 3,58 *** 3,02 4,21 ** 
Nombre de personnes plus de 65 ans 0,17 0,18  0,19 0,17  0,17 0,18  0,17 0,37  
Superficie totale possédée (en ha) 2,08 0,97 *** 1,76 2,04  1,94 2,53 *** 1,98 3,72 *** 
Superficie en plaine/bas-fond possédée (en ha) 1,15 0,50 *** 0,93 1,13 * 1,07 1,35 ** 1,09 1,81 ** 
Superficie en baiboho possédée (en ha) 0,45 0,10 *** 0,26 0,45 *** 0,42 0,43  0,42 0,62  
Superficie en plateau possédée (en ha) 0,44 0,22 *** 0,44 0,42  0,40 0,65 *** 0,42 0,87 ** 
Superficie en colline possédée (en ha) 0,04 0,12  0,11 0,04 ** 0,04 0,09 * 0,05 0,41 * 
Superficie en gradin possédée (en ha) 0,00 0,03  0,02 0,00  0,01 0,01  0,01 0,01  
Ménage est allochtone 0,33 0,22 * 0,27 0,33  0,32 0,32  0,32 0,41  
Distance au GF (heures, imputée si manquante) 1,01 0,76 * 0,81 1,02 ** 1,00 0,84 ** 0,99 0,82  
Note : Chiffres extrapolés à partir d’un échantillon de 1860 ménages propriétaires de parcelles. Test de différence entre “oui” et “non” pour chaque profil. Significativité : *** à 1%, ** à 5%, * à 10% 
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Annex 3: Predictives factors for modes of rights validation. Probit and LPM.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pas de 
sécurisation 












Age du chef  -0.022*** 0.005 0.005 0.025*** 0.000 
de ménage (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Niveau d'éducation  0.049 -0.027 -0.023 0.215* -0.003 
du chef (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.00) 
Score de richesse  -0.120** 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.012 0.020*** 
du ménage (actifs) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) 
Score de richesse  0.054 0.252*** 0.237*** 0.176* 0.027*** 
du ménage (habitat) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) 
Le chef de ménage  0.559** 0.223* 0.162 -0.340 0.011 
est une femme (0.22) (0.11) (0.10) (0.26) (0.01) 
Taille du ménage 0.688*** -0.071 -0.112 0.041 -0.012 
 (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.01) 
Composition démographique du ménage (réf : personnes âgées plus de 65 ans) 
Nombre d'enfants  -0.521** 0.059 0.091 -0.050 0.009 
moins de 14 ans (0.23) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.01) 
Nombre d'adultes  -0.587*** 0.124 0.160* 0.037 0.014* 
de 14 à 65 ans (0.21) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.01) 
Superficie totale  0.371 0.396 0.339 -0.073 0.004 
possédée (en ha) (0.43) (0.25) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03) 
Superficie totale par type de terrain (réf : gradin) 
Superficie totale  -0.585 -0.300 -0.236 0.171 0.001 
en bas fond possédée 
(en ha) 
(0.42) (0.25) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03) 
Superficie totale  -0.809* -0.425* -0.351 0.106 -0.009 




Superficie totale  -0.491 -0.341 -0.282 0.162 0.003 
en plateau possédée 
(en ha) 
(0.44) (0.25) (0.26) (0.18) (0.03) 
Superficie totale  -0.056 -0.104 -0.212 0.429** 0.006 
en colline possédée (en 
ha) 
(0.37) (0.27) (0.26) (0.21) (0.03) 
Ménage est allochtone -0.360 0.070 0.103 0.442** 0.010 
 (0.25) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (0.01) 
Distance au GF  -0.200 0.163* 0.181* 0.128 0.011 
(heures, imputée si 
manquante) 
(0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.18) (0.01) 
Ménage ayant  -0.137 0.234 0.181 0.961*** 0.010 
un conflit sur les 
parcelles 
(0.31) (0.16) (0.15) (0.30) (0.02) 
% Parcelles  -0.714 1.339** 1.328*** 0.649 0.108 
en faire-valoir indirect (0.72) (0.53) (0.50) (0.69) (0.08) 
Constant -0.970** -2.170*** -2.181*** -8.782*** 0.051** 
 (0.45) (0.28) (0.26) (0.71) (0.02) 
Observations 1860 1674 1860 1327 1860 
Note: Ecart-type en parenthèses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Les colonnes (1)-(4) sont des Probit, la 
colonne (5) est une LMP. 
 
